KidCTL
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Security

Guides · Security

Limitations and known gaps

On this page

KidCTL makes it hard for children to get around the rules – but there is no such thing as complete security. This page openly lists what KidCTL deliberately doesn’t do and where known gaps are. It is the complete list; the short version is in the README.

Note

What is listed here does not count as a security vulnerability under the security policy. Please report new ways in which a child without admin rights gets around the time limit, app control or web filter confidentially.

Everywhere

  • Physical access: without hardening, every lock can be bypassed, e.g. with a USB stick or via the boot menu. KidCTL itself only protects the running system.
  • No idle detection: screen time keeps running as long as the child is signed in – even if they’re not doing anything.
  • VPN and fixed IP addresses: the web filter works via DNS (name resolution). Anyone who opens a website directly by its IP address (including DNS-over-HTTPS via an IP address) or uses a VPN with fixed IP addresses bypasses it. VPNs are not actively detected.
  • Steam: allowing Steam effectively allows everything that can be started via Steam – including via “Add a Non-Steam Game”. The Steam library belongs to the child (Steam updates itself); Steam can only be controlled as a whole. Steam and Heroic offer no control of individual games.
  • Block list exceptions: an exception doesn’t apply to more specific entries of a block list (example: exception example.com, the list blocks ads.example.com – that stays blocked).
  • Chat: no pictures or files, no read receipts.
  • Family deleted, device removed: An agent that is not connected at that moment doesn’t learn about it and keeps applying the last saved rules until it is uninstalled. Connected agents lift all restrictions when the family is deleted.
  • No browsing history: KidCTL deliberately doesn’t store which allowed websites were visited – only what was blocked.
  • Server in a shared Docker network: login locks and ADMIN_ALLOW_NETS use the address reported by Traefik, provided the connection comes from TRUSTED_PROXIES (default: private networks). Other containers in the same network can then pose as any address; the only remedy is to set TRUSTED_PROXIES to the address of the Traefik container (see Server).

Linux

  • Desktops: only KDE Plasma and GNOME on Wayland; no X11, no other desktops (Cinnamon and COSMIC are to follow).

  • Debian/Ubuntu: 64-bit PCs (amd64) only.

  • GNOME: no automatic login (GDM autologin) for children – with the sign-in lock active the screen would stay black. The web interface reports such a setting under “Integrity”.

  • Ubuntu: “Files” (Nautilus) is always allowed because Ubuntu’s desktop icons need it.

  • Snap and Flatpak: allowing a Snap or Flatpak app allows everything inside its sandbox (including snap run --shell or flatpak run --command). Flatpak apps that the child installs just for themselves (flatpak --user) are not supported.

  • Updates: on Linux the agent doesn’t update itself but comes with the normal system updates (pacman or apt).

  • Widgets and extensions: Plasma widgets and GNOME extensions that the child installs themselves run inside the desktop shell and are not program starts. They don’t get around the time limit, web filter or sign-out.

  • Shell commands: commands such as sh -c … (e.g. via KRunner) are allowed because parts of the system need them. They can only start allowed programs, though: the child’s own programs and scripts from their home folder don’t run.

  • System scripts: shell scripts from /usr, /etc and /opt are always allowed (the program they start is checked). Applications that consist only of a shell script under /usr therefore can’t be blocked.

  • Helper programs: programs that an allowed app calls internally (e.g. git from Kate) are blocked until they are allowed themselves.

  • Web filter: programs that ask systemd’s name resolution directly (e.g. resolvectl) bypass it; browsers and normal programs don’t. If the firewall configuration is reloaded or removed, the filter can be open for up to 60 seconds until KidCTL restores it.

  • Tooltip on GNOME: the AppIndicator extension shows no tooltip on hover. The remaining time is shown at the top of the icon’s menu; warnings and the countdown work as before.

  • Lutris and Bottles: games that run via Lutris or Bottles (Wine) are not detected as games by KidCTL – they don’t count towards game time or the game limit. As a workaround, use the “Counts as a game” switch in the program list, if the game appears there.

Windows

  • x64 only: no Windows on ARM.
  • Sign-in screen: for the sign-in lock, KidCTL disables the account. Windows then hides it on the sign-in screen (via “Other user” only “account disabled” appears); there is no custom notice.
  • Web filter for the whole computer: the filter of the child who is currently signed in at the front applies – also to services, background programs and users signed in in the background, e.g. a parent who stays signed in via “Switch user”, and their company VPN.
  • Windows services are always allowed: in allow-list mode, Windows Update, Defender, SmartScreen, time synchronisation, certificates, licences and the connectivity test stay reachable. Known background noise (telemetry, widgets, weather, Edge configuration) stays blocked and doesn’t appear in the log. Bing is the default search in Edge and stays visible so that the child can ask for access.
  • Open connections: after a user switch, blocking only applies to new connections; a running download of a child continues until it finishes. After a network adapter is added (e.g. VPN), Windows can use its DNS servers for up to 30 seconds.
  • Foreign DNS service: at startup KidCTL stops any running unbound.exe, including one that doesn’t belong to KidCTL.
  • Very short programs: app control continuously checks started programs. Very short-lived programs (e.g. reg.exe from cmd /c) can slip through; the child’s own programs still don’t run because of the execution ban. cmd /c … is allowed because Windows components need it – what it starts is checked.
  • Allowed apps in the profile: the child can put their own libraries (DLLs) into the folder of an allowed app in the user profile – as with Steam.
  • Installing on their own: with app control active the child can’t install anything (installer in the Downloads folder). Programs that Windows already blocks at startup show no notification and no “Ask for access” – the parents allow them in the web interface or briefly switch to “Off” for installing.
  • Other writable folders (e.g. under C:\ProgramData) have no execution ban: programs in them that belong to the child are blocked, libraries (DLLs) from them are not.
  • Store apps: the built-in Microsoft apps show names from a fixed list; other Store apps the name from the app package.
  • Full-screen games: warning windows don’t appear over games in exclusive full screen; sign-out still happens.
  • Games without a launcher: a game that is started directly via its .exe, without a launcher and without a known manifest, only counts as a game if “Counts as a game” is switched on for it in the program list.
  • Ubisoft Connect and Wargaming: KidCTL only detects their games while the launcher starts them. The name comes from the .exe, and each .exe counts as a separate game.
  • Tray app: a child could falsify the display of other users’ tray apps. Enforcement by the KidCTL service is not affected.
  • No code signature: SmartScreen asks on first installation, Defender may report false positives – see Code signing.

Edit on GitHub · German is the source; please change both languages.